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In the 1950s a host of western intellectuals eagerly announced The End of 
Ideology, a prediction in part based on a precipitous decline in the influence of 
Marxism in several advanced industrialized states. The world-wide instance 
and impact of 1968 quickly relegated such triumphant pronoucements to the 
(temporary) rubbish heap of history. The 1970s, in particular, saw a substan- 
tive and unexpected revival of the Marxist tradition in many corners of the 
globe. Yet the demise of the Portuguese Revolution and the slow extinction of 
Italy's 'creeping May' did much to dampen European Marxist spirits, leading 
many erstwhile Marxists to declare, in the course of the 1980s, their Adieux au 
prole'tariat. Finally, the recent implosion of most examples of 'actually exist- 
ing socialism' seems to have definitively moved back the clock to the 1950s 
again, with discussions of The End of History dominating the intellectuals' 
terrain. 
Was global 1968 the last gasp of a dying era rather than a portent of 
greater things to come? Regardless of the answer, a sober assessment of 1968 
shows that the actual events associated with that year bear only limited corre- 
spondence with the predictions of the Marxist school. France and 
Czechoslovakia were, in a sense, the two exceptions which squarely fit the 
Marxist emphasis on the role of the proletariat in the emancipatory process. 
Most everyplace else saw non-proletarian activists in the forefront of events. 
And even France and Czechoslovakia were less than brilliant cases of the 
forward march of history. The brutal repression of the Prague Spring by a 
coalition of nominally Marxist forces and the sudden acquiescence of the 
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French working class, when offered a hefty wage increase, served to cloud the 
certainties of orthodox Marxists. Only the soon ascending Italian 'creeping 
May' and the later flickers of the 'revolution of the carnations' helped to stave 
off graver doubts for a while. 
The last major wave of working class activism prior to the late 1960s and 
the 1970s, the tremendous wave of World War I1 resistance movements in 
southern Europe, had also been a less-than-classic case of proletarian self- 
emancipation via class struggle, similar to most instances of 1968. While 
certainly in Italy, Greece, and Yugoslavia firmly rooted in the working class 
left, it can be argued that the social-emancipatory dimension of antifascist 
resistance owed much of its overwhelming domestic support to its close iden- 
tification with, and its origins in, the issues and the aura of national liberation. 
The survival of strongholds of Marxist beliefs in much of southern Europe 
throughout the post-World War I1 decades, then, ironically owed much to yet 
another transnational social movement, the Resistance, which clearly did not 
correspond to the parameters of social action proclaimed by Marxist ortho- 
doxy. 
If 1968 and World War I1 resistance movements did not conform to 
Marxist predictions, was there ever a time when prototypical working class 
movements determined major aspects of a country's or a continent's social, 
political, and cultural landscape? Was there ever a time when Marxism 
appeared to coincide with actual events and processes? 
The answer is yes. And this is where the three books under review fit in 
rather well, as they elucidate key aspects of the one time span which tended to 
confirm Marxist beliefs, the years 1887-1936. Arguably, these fifty years 
were, thus far, the only years in which the major social trends in European 
society tended to conform with orthodox Marxist tenets. These fifty years 
were the only ones in which nominally Marxist parties with a working class 
base were willingly or unwillingly engaged in economic and political class 
struggle activities thereby crucially determining the contours of their societies 
and the continent as a whole. 
Admittedly, 1887 is a somewhat arbitrary starting date of this historical 
period. (The closing date, as we will see, is far more precise). Stanley Pierson 
chose it for his study in part because July 1887 saw the birth of the first jour- 
nalistic venture of SPD intellectuals which gave rise to inner-party contro- 
versy. The relevance of the late 1880s as the starting date of the "fifty years of 
Marxist hegemony" is underscored by the following observation. The closing 
years of Bismarck's Socialist Laws experienced the apparent irreversibility of 
the rise of German Marxism to prominence. And from this German 'home 
base,' Marxism set out in subsequent decades to conquer many organized 
European workers' worlds. 
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Stanley Pierson's contribution is two-fold, focussing on two prominent 
real or potential contradictions in the theory and practice of German Marxism. 
First, Pierson points out three faces of Marxism that may not always peace- 
fully coexist. The 'critical' face of Marxism grows out of the Marxist claim 
adequately to represent the main features and inherent contradictions of 
contemporary societies. The 'apologetic' face of Marxism pertains to Marxist 
identification with working class interests. The 'visionary' face of Marxism 
derives from Marxist advocacy of the necessity of radical social and political 
change in order to see working class interests win out over the constraints of 
contemporary society. Second, Pierson underscores the inherent contradiction 
in Marxist claims between a fervent belief in economic determinism and the 
simultaneous recognition of human agency as a key motor force of history. 
Both insights are obviously not unique to Pierson. What makes his study 
somewhat unusual is Pierson's focus on the role of intellectuals in the evolu- 
tion of Marxism in Germany. Pierson systematically addresses the role intel- 
lectuals played in the theory and practice of German social democracy, along 
the way casting interesting glances at many long-forgotten issues polarizing 
the early German Social Democratic Party (SPD). For intellectuals amongst 
the party's ranks, the situation around the turn of the century was already less 
than ideal, as the later observation by Hendrik de Man underscores, a citation 
serving as the opening lines to Pierson's work: "Few among the active Social 
Democratic intellectuals ever lose the depressing feeling that one is suffered 
as a guest in a foreign home, whose inhabitants have other habits." 
It is one of Pierson's key conclusions that many, though by no means all, 
SPD intellectuals spent much of their productive time trying to grapple with 
the intricacies of these two contradictions. Thus it was only too natural for 
intellectuals to cast doubts on the validity of economic determinism, for a 
strict interpretation of that thesis would have relegated the position of party 
intellectuals to that of loyal workers amongst a multitude of party workers, 
with no special responsibilities. The opposite pole of this contradiction, a 
stress on voluntarism, the need to work at convincing a majority of people 
(workers) of the validity of Marxist forecasts, held much more promise and 
promised more fame to party intellectuals. 
Karl Kautsky and Franz Mehring were only two of many SPD intellectu- 
als who began their socialist career firmly convinced of the spontaneous 
generation of revolutionary working-class consciousness on the basis of 
workers' objective experiences but then soon altered their approach and 
adopted various forms of interventionist beliefs combined with elements of 
paternalism. Pierson highlights Rosa Luxemburg as a different example of a 
party intellectual, someone consistently proclaiming both economic determin- 
ism and worlung-class spontaneity as two sides of an asymmetrical coin. Yet 
Luxemburg was the exception proving the rule. Growing disbelief in the 
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supposedly objectively determined march of history was a key factor behind 
the rise of revisionism. The revisionist Lily Braun utilized the assault on 
determinist certainties in other areas as a loophole from which to set out in 
pursuit of an equally iconoclastic union of feminism and Marxism. Some revi- 
sionists eventually even arrived at the conclusion that there was no need for 
any attempts to instill the 'proper' working-class consciousness, as they came 
to regard this much-proclaimed goal as a figment of the imagination, some- 
thing that would come about neither automatically nor as a result of artificial 
stimulation by intellectuals. Meanwhile radical Marxists, like Anton 
Pannekoek, developed proto-Gramscian notions of bourgeois cultural hege- 
mony in an attempt to ascertain why German workers had not yet achieved 
their true calling. And German syndicalists within the SPD broke with the 
determinist variant of Marxist orthodoxy by proclaiming the necessity to 
instill enthusiasm in the masses on the road to power. 
On balance most party intellectuals, regardless of their factional alle- 
giances, opted for an active role for Marxist intellectuals in the genesis of the 
desired class consciousness, despite frequent continued adherence to the 
tenets of economic determinism. It was therefore only symptomatic that the 
SPD party leadership in 1906 chose an utterly traditional format when estab- 
lishing a party school in Berlin. Rejecting Otto Riihle's proposal to establish 
decentralized correspondence courses in which proletarian party members 
would be trained in reading, writing and rhetoric so that they could become an 
'intellectual elite' themselves, the party opted for Heinrich Schulz's idea to 
create a central party school where 'talented young comrades' could be 
imbued with the spirit of orthodox Marxist theory. 
Compared to his treatment of the contradictions between determinism 
and agency (mediated by intellectuals), Pierson's discussion of the interplay 
of the three faces of Marxism is less convincing. Perhaps his major conceptual 
lapse is the repeated unjustified equation of the defense of working-class 
interests, the 'apologetic' face of Marxism, with the defense of the party struc- 
ture and infrastructure as such. While there is nothing wrong in pointing out 
this party-centered pragmatism throughout the early history of the SPD, it 
should have been identified as an analytically separate, perhaps a fourth, face 
of Marxism. 
But this tendency towards the blurring of analytical distinctions is a more 
common problem of Pierson's study. Major portions of this work consist of a 
somewhat overly detailed recounting of many SPD debates with scant and 
incidental attention given to analytical conclusions. Moreover, given the 
focus on party intellectuals belonging to dissident factions of the right or left, 
the reader can easily lose sight of the fact that party intellectuals were aligned 
on all sides of the factional divides, including the silent majority of the 
frequently shifting party center. Furthermore, many leading spokespersons for 
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any number of party tendencies, such as August Bebel and Eduard Bernstein, 
cannot be classified as intellectuals in any usual sense of that term. To 
Pierson's credit, he does on occasion remind the reader of this less-than- 
clearcut state of affairs, but he fails to draw the necessary conclusions. For, 
rather than being a problem affecting party intellectuals only or mostly, did 
not the contradiction between determinism and voluntarism affect all party 
activists alike? 
Marxist Intellectuals and the Working-Class Mentality ends in 1912. German 
Social Democracy and the Rise of Nazism picks up the story sixteen years 
later. But the storyline and the actors within it are almost completely different. 
Within Europe as a whole the years 1912-1928 witnessed one world war; the 
demise of the Hohenzollern, Habsburg, and Romanov dynasties; a wave of 
working-class unrest (1917-1923); and several failed - and one successful 
- Soviet republics. Small wonder that in 1928 little would be as it had been 
in 1912, in Germany and elsewhere on the continent. 
Yet the same contradictions that Pierson targets in his work remained a 
hallmark of Marxism throughout these sixteen turbulent years and thereafter. 
The major difference was their far more public manifestation in the form of 
organisational schisms. Several of the major splits in the Marxist movement 
in the first three decades of the twentieth century can, in fact, be traced back in 
part to the on going battle over determinism versus voluntarism in Marxist 
theory and practice. Revolutionary syndicalism, at any rate with solid roots in 
the anarchist tradition, can be interpreted as a product of the increasing immo- 
bilism of Second International Marxism. The creation of the Third 
International has likewise many points of origin in the rebellion of party 
activists against the quasi-religious belief in the inevitable forward march of 
labor by many leading lights of the Second International. Even Pierson's three 
faces of Marxism survived and prospered, although the most visible departure 
in this respect was the addition of a fifth face on top of the party-pragmatic 
fourth: the defense of the Soviet fatherland as a new variant of 'apologetic' 
Marxism. 
In the years 1928-1933, as in 1887-1912, the model party of the Second 
International was still beholden to the determinist view. In Donna Harsch's 
words: "Social Democrats saw themselves as objects of bourgeois society 
rather than as subjects who could fundamentally shape events." (240) This 
legacy weighed heavily on German socialists who were then facing an 
unprecedentedly and unusually dynamic enemy, fascism. The struggle against 
nazism soon became the litmus test for the Marxist movement, and socialists 
everywhere turned their attention to German events, as German social democ- 
racy was still regarded as the authority within Second International Marxism. 
Donna Harsch lays bare another one of the SPD's constitutional contra- 
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dictions: the uneasy though symbiotic coexistence of a fair amount of internal 
dynamism with a distinct tendency towards external immobility. Whereas on 
a local and district level the party repeatedly manifested unusual instances of 
creativity and flexibility, precisely this welter of ill-coordinated local initia- 
tives led to reinforced passivity on the national leadership level. For the most 
part, the party executive continued to adhere to time-worn strategy and tactics, 
no longer adequate to respond to rapidly changing circumstances. 
Unfortunately, major portions of Harsch's study focus precisely on the barely 
evolving leadership response rather than the innovations from below. 
Where Harsch is best is in her discussion of two qualitatively new depar- 
tures for the SPD as a whole, though in one case the proposal was never 
adopted and in the other only when it was already too late. Her discussion of 
the first new tactic, various ill-fated attempts to have the party officially adopt 
a positive economic stimulus plan to combat unemployment, is well-taken 
and informative. Her best pages, however, are in her chapter on the second 
initiative, the Iron Front. In December 193 1 the SPD, its affiliated trade union 
bodies, its paramilitary force, and its Sports Federation engaged in the 
construction of an extraparliamentary umbrella organization specifically 
designed to combat the radical Right. It constituted a final recognition that 
defensive actions were increasingly counterproductive and that the best 
defense would henceforth be an offense. 
New methods of struggle and new means of propaganda were designed 
and implemented as key features of Iron Front politics. Under the inspiration 
of a Russian CmigrC, Sergei Chakhotin, new symbols (the three arrows) were 
designed to unify and galvanize the party's ranks. New emphasis on icono- 
graphic and ritualistic elements of propaganda were deployed to instill enthu- 
siasm and purpose. The results surpassed most expectations. From a relatively 
stayed and immobile organisation the SPD began to turn into an organisation 
espousing militant republicanism and popular socialism. "Excitement gripped 
SPD districts of all political orientations." (173) SPD election results were 
most favorable in those districts or cities where the new tactics of the Iron 
Front had been applied most rigorously, inspiring a rapid spread of this 
approach. 
Yet right in the middle of the first national election campaign held under 
the auspices of Iron Front dynamism, the July 1932 electoral contest, the 
bubble burst. When Chancellor Franz von Papen arbitrarily toppled the last 
SPD government stronghold, the SPD-controlled Prussian state government, 
the SPD leadership decided to give in without struggle. For most party 
activists, recently energized by the creativity of the Iron Front, this passive act 
of acquiescence by the executive denoted the continuation of SPD politics as 
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usual. When push came to shove, the SPD could not overcome its inertia bred 
over many decades of firm belief in the automatism of social developments. 
Neither Harsch's discussion of the search for an active economic policy 
nor her rendering of the Iron Front campaigns are totally new historiographi- 
cal contributions, but they are the most concise and eloquent description in the 
English language. An additional interesting key feature of Harsch's work is 
her focus on the crucial contributions by party leftists and especially neo-revi- 
sionists in the closing years of the Weimar Republic. What motion there was 
within the SPD often emanated from these circles. Yet, tragically, the Iron 
Front was one of the few incidents when left oppositionists and neo-revision- 
ists were joining forces to outflank traditionalist party functionaries. Even the 
more flexible proponents of the Iron Front, however, turned a cold shoulder 
on defenders of economic planning mechanisms. And, vice versa, advocates 
of economic planning shied away from radical political action. "In fact, the 
sympathetic historian becomes exasperated precisely because so many of the 
pieces of the puzzle were there, yet the puzzle could not be solved." (241) Six 
months after the Papen coup in Prussia, Germany was led by a legally- 
appointed dictator. 
Donna Harsch does not believe that the Nazi conquest of Germany was 
inevitable. Weimar Germany labored under the legacy of structural precondi- 
tions compounded by conjunctural negative factors, primarily the Great 
Depression, which made positive solutions hard to come by. But precisely the 
interaction of structure and contingency engendered the primacy of politics in 
the closing years of the Weimar Republic. It was up to forces such as the SPD 
to provide the answers. Weighed down by immobilism, the SPD could not 
meet the challenge. 
The person who came closest to solving the puzzle left unfinished at the end 
of Harsch's study was a Flemish social democrat, Hendrik de Man, then living 
in Germany. His closest political associates were precisely the neo-revision- 
ists at the center of German Social Democracy and the Rise of Nazism, with 
Carlo Mierendorff, the leading defender of Iron Front tactics, a frequent inter- 
locutor. Deeply disturbed by the rise of fascism in Germany, de Man began to 
draw conclusions which soon crystallized into a concerted economic and 
political plan, designed to create the dynamism that had failed the German 
socialist movement confronted by Nazi successes. Composed of elements 
drawing on the most innovative features of SPD activism - economic plan- 
ning designs; united front tactics; new departure in propaganda methods; the 
creation of a positive, offensive image - Hendrik de Man chose the neo-revi- 
sionist stronghold of Hamburg as his first home base from which to conquer 
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the national SPD and thus change the face of German politics. 
It was his misfortune that his project did not get off the ground until two 
months before the end of Weimar Germany. He was therefore forced to 
change the terrain of battle to his native Belgium where, within less than a 
year, he managed to change completely the outlook and direction of Belgian 
social democracy and to captivate much of the nation. Yet under the pressure 
of national and international events, by 1935 de Man once again changed his 
focus and engaged his party in a series of coalition governments, effectively 
ending the short-lived mystique and promise of the Plan de Man. 
It is unfortunate that Donna Harsch passes over de Man's contribution in 
silence. And this neglect goes hand-in-hand with her somewhat undifferenti- 
ated assessment of the role of neo-revisionism in general. Harsch notes within 
German neo-revisionism a de facto split into a 'national' tendency and a 'left 
populist' or 'neo-Jacobin' tendency, with most of her attention bestowed on 
the latter group, amongst them Carlo Mierendorff. Harsch is convinced of 
their essentially moderate nature and repeatedly assures the reader that their 
radicalism and use of class language in the campaigns of the Iron Front were 
a mere "concession to activists and leftists." (183) As an underground activist, 
Mierendorff later made much use of national, as opposed to class-based, 
language. And, combined with his moderation prior to 1931, it only stands to 
reason, implies Harsch, that the radicalism of 1932 was a temporary tactical 
ploy. 
Yet the case of Hendrik de Man, the close acquaintance of Mierendorff 
and subsequent puzzle solver, proves that the radicalization of means and 
goals was a measured and well-reasoned response to changing conditions. 
Neo-revisionists, just like anyone else, were subject to influences from the 
world at large. And the politics of late Weimar were desperate enough to 
cause more than minor adjustments in the political arsenal of flexible thinkers. 
In the words of de Man, published in the Hamburg SPD daily, the Hamburger 
Echo, at the very end of 1932: "Given the revolutionary situation of today, 
nothing is more inopportune than that which was called opportune up to now; 
now the only things that are possible and practical are what appeared, yester- 
day, as impossible and impractical." 
After the fall of Weimar Germany, Spain became the next hotbed of European 
social struggles. Starting in the latter months of 1933, Spanish democracy was 
increasingly rent by vicious social and political struggles, culminating in the 
Spanish Civil War. No other European country in the 1930s experienced such 
bitter economic and political class struggles as did Spain in the short lifespan 
of its Second Republic. Stanley Payne's Spain's First Democracy is a 
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comprehensive and detailed narrative of the political history of the Second 
Republic up to the outbreak of civil war. While openly proclaiming his pref- 
erence for conservative options, he aims to give a factual account, and he has 
largely succeeded in doing so. 
Stanley Payne is only one of many scholars pointing to the radicalization 
of the Spanish section of the Second International, the PSOE, as a key factor 
in the disintegration of the Second Spanish Republic. In part as a reaction to 
the very recent failure of German social democracy in its attempt to stem the 
tide of the radical Right, Spanish social democrats, starting in the fall of 1933, 
embarked on an openly revolutionary course of action, complete with secret 
insurrectionary plans, party militias, stockpiling of weapons, and the like. 
Reaching a first highpoint in the Asturian Commune of October 1934, signif- 
icant elements of Spanish social democracy continued to deny support to 
republican institutions and steadfastly pursued their collision course, helping 
to polarize further an already highly politicized nation. It was the most 
remarkable departure from Second International determinism in the history of 
European social democracy. 
Where Payne goes overboard in his assessment of Spanish socialism in 
the 1930s is in his tendency occasionally to imply that PSOE radicalism was 
the key factor behind the polarization of Spain. Payne is correct in pointing to 
social democrats as a key source of plentiful instances of individual terrorism 
in Second Republic Spain, particularly in the six months prior to the Franco 
coup. Yet to go as far as to project primary blame for Spain's political parox- 
ysms onto the PSOE is a highly debatable proposition. 
Still, what happened in Spain's first democracy so that a social democra- 
tic party felt compelled to adopt revolutionary tactics including bouts with 
individual terrorism? After all, as Payne makes clear, Spanish social democ- 
racy, up to 1933, was one of the traditionally most moderate and complacent 
sections of the Second International. As a matter of fact, it can be argued that 
anarcho-syndicalism became such a prominent force in Spanish politics in 
part as a result of traditional PSOE moderation and peaceful coexistence with 
the status quo in the decades leading up to the proclamation of the Second 
Republic. This is not the place to lay out the contours of Spanish politics and 
society in the 1930s, a task admirably completed by Payne's work under 
review. Let me instead draw attention to the overall explanatory framework 
employed by Stanley Payne, outlining the structural and conjunctural sources 
of the problems giving rise to PSOE radicalism and voluntarism and, ulti- 
mately, the Franco regime. 
In a few isolated but very important pages, Stanley Payne summarizes 
the German Marxist historian Detlev Peukert's assessment of the origins of 
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Weimar Germany's problems with democracy and adapts Peukert's argument 
to Spanish conditions. In his work on Weimas Germany, Detlev Peukert diag- 
nosed the Weimar Era as constituting the crisis years of classic modernity in 
Germany. Ever since the turn of the century, but particularly prominently in 
the fourteen years of the Weimar Republic, German society experienced rapid 
and massive encounters with modernity: modern social policy; modem 
economic and technical developments; revolutions in natural science; radical 
experiments in modem art, music, architecture and literature; and much more. 
This unprecedentedly rapid modernization of society and culture simultane- 
ously fascinated and horrified contemporaries. As a result, each new departure 
called forth an equally vigorous countermove. so that Weimar Germany saw a 
vast number of conflicting tendencies and movements at play in all walks of 
life and leading in all directions simultaneously. Given the constraints of the 
concrete political and economic conjuncture after 1928, Weimar democracy 
was likely to capsize on these rocky shores, and capsize it did. 
Where Payne takes off from Peukert is in his recognition of a similar 
crisis of modernity in the Spanish state, but with the additional birthmark of 
relative backwardness. Careful not to declare Spain an underdeveloped 
nation, Payne underscores Spain's experience of "partial and uneven 
modernisation," (123) its peculiar hybrid status between modernization and 
underdevelopment. "Modem Spanish politics had regularly featured a rather 
unique conjunction of advanced political forms and institutions amid socio- 
economic backwardness ... . The opportunity for mass mobilisation and 
untrammeled democracy [during the brief lifespan of Spain's Second 
Republic] amid the depression, following an unprecedented generation of 
accelerated modernisation, suddenly raised the classic 'Spanish contradiction' 
to a new level that made revolutionary challenges almost inevitable, though 
not at all irresistible." (38 1) 
Similar to Donna Harsch, Stanley Payne subscribes to the primacy of 
politics thesis. Recognizing Spain's predicament as the outgrowth of an unfa- 
vorable combination of long-term structure, conjuncture and day-to-day poli- 
tics, Payne is adamant in placing most blame on Spanish politicians. As a 
logical consequence of this approach, Payne, like Harsch, pays most careful 
attention to political affairs and does not hesitate to take sides. But whereas 
Harsch places most faith in innovative departures within social democracy, 
Payne shows his conservative colors quite openly in his recommendation that 
a Center-Right coalition would have been the best solution for the early years 
of the Republic. And, in his opinion, the closing years up to 1936 would have 
been best served by either a "national Republican dictatorship" (350) or even 
a government by the CEDA, the Spanish homologue to the Austrofascist 
Social Christian Party of DollfuB and Schuschnigg, advocates of "a semicor- 
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porative and more authoritarian system" (380) which would have put an end 
to democracy but, according to Payne, would also have pre-empted the civil 
war and the Franco regime. 
As can be surmised from these comments, Payne never shows even an 
ounce of sympathy for the forces of the Spanish Left, Marxist or otherwise. 
Yet his valuable comments on the relevance of what some Marxists have 
termed the 'law of uneven and combined development,' in addition to his 
rigorous objectivity in outlining the highlights of the political life of Spain's 
Second Republic, make his book a valuable addition to the slowly increasing 
supply of Spanish historical studies in the English language. Spain's First 
Democracy is proof of the fertile engagement of leading conservative histori- 
ans with the contributions of Marxist historiography. It is more than sympto- 
matic that Payne chose two brief sentences by Antonio Gramsci as his fron- 
tispiece. 
Weimar Germany and Spain's Second Republic constitute two instances 
dramatizing the relevance of structure, agency and contingency in the shaping 
of modern European history. The victory of the radical Right and the collapse 
of republics, argue Harsch and Payne, were not predetermined outcomes of 
the crisis years of classic modernity, though certainly not unlikely results. 
Engagement in the political process could and did substantially alter the even- 
tual outcomes. Determinism and voluntarism, as described by Pierson for 
early German social democracy, each left their own imprint not only on the 
history of the Left, but on the trajectory of entire nations. In the case of the late 
Weimar SPD, the legacy of determinism turned out to be as destructive as the 
subsequent voluntarist experiments by the Second Republic PSOE. It was not 
for lack of trying that European Marxism failed to meet the challenge. 
One month prior to the Franco coup, Spain was racked by a strike wave 
involving as many as one million workers. This work stoppage was propor- 
tionately equal to the simultaneous two-million strong work stoppage in 
France. The same turbulent month of June 1936 witnessed an even more 
astounding strike epidemic in Belgium, where a fifth of the entire workforce 
walked out. In France and Spain these labor struggles marked the summit and 
supercession of the Popular Fronts. The Belgian strikes turned out to be a 
similar highpoint of Belgian depression politics. With the outbreak of civil 
war in Spain on 17 July, the Spanish and European (largely Marxist) working 
class Left began to lose its recently regained momentum and found itself 
increasingly on the defensive. By the onset of World War I1 the European Left 
was marginalized beyond recognition. Given the subsequent itinerary I 
sketched in the introduction to this essay, June 1936, then, can arguably be 
regarded as the cndpoint of the classic years of Europe's orthodox Marxist 
Left. 
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What accounts for this fifty-year period (1887-1936) in which Marxism 
came to the fore not only as an ideology but as a social movement with 
substantial working-class support? What appears to unify these classic 
decades of the European Left, when class struggle politics and economics 
appeared to shape European politics and society more than ever before or 
since? 
This may be the place to draw attention to the Gramsci quotation chosen 
by Stanley Payne to introduce his book: "The old is dying and the new cannot 
be born. In the interregnum, a great variety of morbid symptoms appear." 
Departing from Gramsci's meaning of these phrases, could it be that the clas- 
sic years of European Marxism, the decades when Marxist predictions came 
close to be true, were so turbulent not because the European proletariat came 
into its own but instead because of the relative immaturity of bourgeois civil 
society? Were the years of 'post-modernity' not the years of 'late capitalism' 
but the years of mature capitalism? Could it be that the years of 'classic 
modernity' were the first and final decades of orthodox Marxist purchase on 
social reality? Could classic Marxism be considered an ideology intimately 
linked to the crisis decades of classic modernity rather than the steady rise of 
the proletariat to world-historical importance and hegemony? If this is the 
case, what then will follow mature, 'post-modern' capitalism? What will be 
the contours of an emancipatory project in the twenty-first century? Can 
orthodox Marxism be sufficiently reconstructed to serve as a method and 
inspiration? 
Instead of providing fragmentary indications towards a tentative answer, 
let me close with yet another citation of Hendrik de Man, whose following 
statement holds true as much for the closing decade of the twentieth century 
as it did in 1933: "I believe, to say it in a nutshell, that the socialism of the 
coming generation will be, on penalty of total failure, as different from the 
socialism of our fathers as their socialism differed from the Communist 
Manifesto." 
